Thursday, January 7, 2010

PAKISTAN FACTS ON PROSTITUTION


There have been 1 million Bangladeshi and more than 200,000 Burmese women trafficked to Karachi, Pakistan. (Indrani Sinha, SANLAAP India, "Paper on Globalization & Human Rights")

A Bengali or Burmese woman could be sold in Pakistan for US$1,500 - 2,500 - depending on age, looks, docility and virginity. For each child or woman sold, the police claim a 15 to 20 percent "commission." ("Rights-South Asia: Slavery Still A Thriving Trade," IPS, 29 December 1997)

200,000 Bangladeshi women have been trafficked to Pakistan for the slave trade and prostitution. (Trafficking in Women and Children: The Cases of Bangladesh, p.8, UBINIG, 1995)

200,000 Bangladeshi women were trafficked to Pakistan in the last ten years, continuing at the rate of 200-400 women monthly.

(CATW - Asia Pacific, Trafficking in Women and Prostitution in the Asia Pacific)

In Pakistan, where most of trafficked Bengali women are sold there are about 1,500 Bengali women in jail and about 200,000 women and children sold into in the slave trade. (estimates by Human Rights organizations in Pakistan, Trafficking in Women and Children: The Cases of Bangladesh, p.14, UBINIG, 1995)

There are over 200,000 undocumented Bangladeshi women in Pakistan, including some 2,000 in jails and shelters. Bangladeshis comprise 80 percent, and Burmese 14 percent, of Karachi’s undocumented immigrants. (Zia Ahmed Awan, affiliate with Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid, Sindh police report in 1993, "Rights-South Asia: Slavery Still A Thriving Trade," IPS, 29 December 1997)

Auctions of girls are arranged for three kinds of buyers : rich visiting Arabs (sheiks, businessmen, visitors, state-financed medical and university students), the rich local gentry, and rural farmers. (CATW - Asia Pacific "Trafficking in Women and Prostitution in the Asia Pacific" (19)

Bangladeshi and Burmese women are being kidnapped, married off to agents by unsuspecting parents, trafficked under false pretenses, or enticed by prospects of a better life, into brothels in Pakistan. Border police and other law enforcement agencies are well aware of the trafficking through entry points into Pakistan like Lahore, Kasur, Bahawalpur, Chhor and Badin. (Sindh police report in 1993, "Rights-South Asia: Slavery Still A Thriving Trade," IPS, 29 December 1997)

Nepalese and Bangladeshi woman and girls are trafficked under false pretenses, such as jobs, then are forced into prostitution in brothels in Pakistan. (CATW - Asia Pacific, Trafficking in Women and Prostitution in the Asia Pacific)

A rise in trafficking of girls, aged 8-15, in Pakistan has occurred during this last decade. (CATW - Asia Pacific, Trafficking in Women and Prostitution in the Asia Pacific)

A Pakistani woman was threatened with contempt of the Supreme Court if she did not allow her ex-husband to have sex with her. Conjugal rights were reinstated to her ex-husband, although she has since remarried. If she refuses to allow her ex-husband to have sex with her she will be punished according to the law. (Anwar Iqbal, "Wife faces contempt in sex case," United Press International, 9 May 1998)

SOURCE:www.paralumun.com

ASIAN WOMEN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE/ Pakistan: cost of a lie


"Kitchen accidents" in which women are set on fire are no rarity in Pakistan. Shahnaz Bokhari, chair of the Pakistan Progressive Women’s Association, has counted over 4,000 cases of this type since 1994 in the three large hospitals of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. She shows us photographs of the burned bodies of Pakistani women every bit as horrific as the pictures of the young Indian women in Bangalore’s Victoria Hospital described in the accompanying article. But in Pakistan dowries and money are not the issue. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reports that at least 80% of Pakistani women are victims of male aggression. The burning of women is part of a widespread pattern of everyday violence.

The Islamic Republic harbours a special category of violence against women known as "crimes of honour". The expression is reminiscent of other societies that used to or still do take a lenient view of crimes committed in response to adultery or in pursuit of vendettas (1). But the sheer scale of the phenomenon in Pakistan makes it a case apart.

Crimes of honour are a pre-Islamic practice. They have no real basis in religion but are encouraged by the rise of religious fundamentalism of which women are the prime victims. The problem of widespread impunity is essentially cultural and social. Crimes of honour are an archaic custom deeply rooted in the tribal societies of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Provinces, as well as those of Punjab and Sindh, where they are known as karo kari (2) killings.

In these rigidly patriarchal communities, wives, daughters, sisters and mothers are killed for the least sexual indiscretion and upon the slightest suspicion of adultery. The local press in Lahore, Peshawar and Islamabad provides many examples. In January this year two brothers in the village of Soom Mori shot and killed a young man whom they had forbidden to walk past their house and talk to their sister. Then they murdered the sister. In Toba Tek Singh a young man killed his sister and explained to the police that he suspected her of "illicit relations" (the consecrated phrase) with a man in the village. She had "taken no notice" of his reprimands.

A newspaper describes the "savagery" of an office clerk in Mandi Bahudin who hacked his wife and five of their children to death with an axe. The remaining two are in hospital in a desperate condition. The murderer "had doubts about his wife’s behaviour." Elsewhere two teenagers were found bathing nude in a river. Accused by a villager of having sexual relations, they were publicly executed by their families, acting in concert. In another village a young women was killed by her brother after admitting to having had pre-marital sex with her own husband.

In all these cases the woman’s body is treated as a repository of the family honour. By committing adultery she disrupts the social order. Her body may be bought, sold or exchanged, but only by decision of a man. If she flouts this rule, or is even suspected of doing so, she is punished. And punishment often means death. The testimony of the accused is of no importance. A mere allegation of illicit sexual relations is considered an intolerable stain on the honour of the whole family, especially its male members. So they are entitled to take justice into their own hands.

One of Amnesty International’s many reports on the subject quotes a human rights worker as saying "the distinction between a woman being guilty and a woman being alleged to be guilty of illicit sex is irrelevant. What impacts on the man’s honour is the public perception, the belief in her infidelity. It is this which blackens honour and for which she is killed ... It is not the truth that honour is about, but public perception of honour" (3). Against this background, the oft-repeated story of the man who dreams his wife is being unfaithful to him, then wakes up and stabs her to death, no longer has the power to shock. Executions are typically carried out by the victim’s brothers, husband or uncles. They may be performed in public, by axe or by gun, depending on the region, and the murderer often gets away.

The scale of the problem is difficult to measure. Last year Dr Shaheen Sardar Ali, chair of the National Commission on the Status of Women, estimated that at least three women a day were victims of honour killings. Over 1,000 such murders were recorded in 1999, but in tribal areas many go unreported. According to HRCP member Tanveer Jahan, the Lahore press reports a case a day in Punjab province alone. He estimates that as 10% of the figure for the country as a whole, giving a total of thousands of victims a year. But the grisly calculation is not so simple, since honour killings are not only a response to sexual relations. Women are also killed for refusing arranged marriages or seeking a divorce. The case of Samia Sarwar is a notorious example.

To honour and obey
Human rights lawyer Hina Jilani, co-founder of Pakistan’s first all-women law firm, says a woman’s right to live depends on strict obedience to social norms and traditions. In many cases her place in society is summed up by the adage Kor ya Gor (home or death). Last year a leader-writer on the English-language daily Dawn wrote: "A woman in Upper Sindh has no individual entity, she is just a chattel. She can be killed by her own son, husband or brother, or her in-laws, with complete impunity and merely on the suspicion of being a kari. She can be killed in cold blood if she declines, which she seldom does, to marry a person chosen by her parents. Only recently a poor girl hanged herself to death as she was being married against her will" (4). And this is what The News, another English-language daily, had to say about the helplessness of rural women: "These voiceless creatures, shackled in a primitive mode of life, are treated worse than even tradable commodities: they are but household possessions, living and dying at their males’ whims" (5). Pakistan’s "men of honour" have the right to be unfaithful. Few forgo that right, even if it puts their partners in mortal danger.

In this system, when a wife, sister or daughter is accused, it is the man who is seen as the victim. The community therefore expects him to mete out punishment. Not to do so would be an even greater dishonour. In such communities an "honour killing" is considered a just punishment, not a crime. This view is shared by many Pakistanis who do not belong to tribal societies. Nevertheless, honour or no honour, murder is murder under Pakistani law. But the law is difficult to apply. There is widespread official indulgence for those who commit honour killings. "The police and courts implicitly accept the practice," says Tanveer Jahan. "They treat the perpetrators quite differently from other criminals."

Islamic courts applying the sharia will accept pleas of extenuating circumstances if the accused is shown to have acted in response to "serious and sudden provocation". A man sentenced to life imprisonment for murdering his daughter and a young man after they had been discovered "in a compromising situation" had his sentence cut to five years by the High Court in Lahore. It ruled that his deed was justified by the behaviour of the victims, which was intolerable in an Islamic state and unbearable for the head of a family. Murderers have even been set free in similar cases. At a recent divorce hearing, women’s rights lawyer Asma Jahangir was rebuked by the judge in terms that illustrate the extent of the problem. "You have no right to be in this court," he told her; "it is you that ought to be in prison."

Sometimes the courts do rule in favour of the victims. But such judgments often provoke hostility and outright violence. Jahangir tells of women shot dead on leaving court after initiating divorce proceedings. And of judges who have paid with their lives for verdicts seen as contrary to tradition or Islam.

"Despite the severity of the problem, the government’s response has been indifferent at best. At worst it has served to exacerbate the suffering of women victims of violence and to obstruct the course of justice," writes Human Rights Watch (6). The military regime keeps a close watch on the courts. In such cases it could institute civil proceedings on its own account, but chooses not to. The figures speak for themselves: barely 10% of men who commit "crimes of honour" are arrested and convicted. This is clearly incitement to murder.

General Pervez Musharaf’s government has made various declarations of intent, but nothing has been done. "A major sustained effort on the part of the government would be needed in order to change the situation. It would have to attack custom and promote education - in short, transform society in depth," a diplomat explains. "But it has no desire to do so." Especially as some Islamic circles close to the regime consider any improvement in the status of women an abomination. They are even calling for reform of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, which grants women certain basic rights. "No government action against honour killings is on the agenda," says Shala Zia, a member of the National Commission on the Status of Women. "The religious front is too powerful."

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the last 20 years, accompanied by general application of the sharia, has been described as the "Talibanisation" of Pakistan. It has profoundly affected the situation of women. The decrees of 1979, which imposed the death penalty for adultery and fornication, not only turned criminal into religious offences. They strengthened the worst tribal traditions. Rape, which is very widespread in Pakistan, has now been decriminalised and the onus of proof is on the victim.

Numerous ordinances, laws and decrees maintain discrimination against women in violation of the Pakistani constitution and international treaties such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Cedaw), which Pakistan ratified in March 1966. But human rights organisations, newspapers and lawyers who campaign for compliance with the constitution and the country’s international obligations frequently come under violent attack.

Honour killings are widespread. Since they frequently go unpunished, they are increasingly used to cover up other crimes. The prominent Lahore-based women’s organisation, Shirkhat Gah, recently cited the case of a man who had killed another villager in a brawl and risked a heavy prison sentence. "Go and kill your sister-in-law," his father told him. "We’ll say she and the dead manwere karo kari."

"The curse of karo kari will have to be chained if Pakistan is to enter the community of nations as a civilised country," Dawn wrote recently (7). Clearly that is not about to happen. "Pakistan is a country that does not yet see the need to respect human rights," says Asma Jahangir. Least of all those of women.

SOURCE:mondediplo.com

10 more things you can do for women in Pakistan and America

The list of things you can do to help women in Pakistan and Pak-American women is virtually endless. Here are a couple of more ideas.

1. Raise good Muslim sons and daughters

Who raised those men who treat women badly? Mostly women, although of course, societal and cultural customs have their role to play as well. For all the talk of women going out to change the world, we tend to forget about the one place where women have the most control: as mothers. Use this power.

It's mothers who can perpetuate notions of what a woman's place is, and they also can perpetuate a lot of the misguided notions about the position of women. Think through what messages you are giving your children. For example, how many mothers spoil their sons by not insisting they clean up their own room, put away their own dishes after dinner, help clean up the house or fold the laundry? Mothers can and should challenge gender stereotypes in their own homes.

This may be considered a small step for moms, but it leads to big steps in the long run. A boy with such training grows is likely to have a fairer view towards women and is more likely to be sensitive to women's issues be they in Pakistan or America.

With regards to daughters, mothers must orient them in the right direction on a personal level as Muslims, then at the academic and career levels. Don't forget that mothers are their daughters' first role models. Be an example for her of a solid, strong Muslim Pakistani.

2. Speak out against injustice

There are many, many areas where Pakistani women are the victims of injustice. While it will take generations to root out practices that harm women, the least you can do is speak out against such acts. Start off with your family. If you see this behavior on your next visit to Pakistan, be critical but in a wise way. Also, get your husband or father to also speak out, since his word is likely to make a strong impact as well.

Too often, the status quo is maintained because Pakistani women do not speak up.

And don't just speak out against the bad. If you see positive behavior, make sure it does not go unnoticed and is praised.

3. Don't underestimate the power of social activities

Do you think organizing social activities such as dinners for is just a waste of time? Not if you know the reality of the Pakistani community here in America.

While most Pakistani women have families they can easily turn to for company and support, there are many who don't. Our communities have plenty of women who are new to the country, students from abroad, or those who recently immigrated here with their families but who are hungry for companionship.

Organizing weekly dinners, teas, Islamic classes in Urdu are all small practical steps that Pak-American women can take to help each other not only cope with loneliness, but more importantly become closer to Allah, if He wills. This creates a much-needed social network.

4. Go into professions that are needed in the community

Often, we encourage our children to go into professions that are seen as prestigious or that will ensure them financial security. These may not, however, be professions that are most needed by the Pakistani or Pak-American community. Identify what the needs are and encourage young women to pursue careers in these fields.

For example, there is dire need for Muslim Pakistani social workers, therapists, family counselors, and other support resources. The shortage of such professional skills within the community forces Pak-Americans to go to those who are often insensitive to our values.

Another field where Pakistani women are needed is law. Marriage, divorce, custody of children, and inheritance are all issues which directly affect Muslim women, and for which they will rarely find a Muslim advocate. There is a need for Pakistani women who know Islamic law and the local law to help women deal with issues like these with sincere, sound advice, as well as sympathetic support.

Is there a Pakistani woman doctor in the house? For the most part, the answer is no. It is no cliche to say that there is a crying need for women in the medical field. Women are especially needed in sensitive fields like obstetrics and gynecology, fertility specialists, etc.

These are among many areas where women, especially Pakistani ones, feel most comfortable discussing exclusively with other women who will understand where they are coming from.

5. Teach Urdu and Islamic studies at weekend schools

Does getting an education degree sound too far-fetched? If so, consider helping Pakistanis in America by teaching at the local Islamic weekend school. This is where a number of Muslim kids (most of whom attend public school) find their only Islamic environment throughout the whole week.

The presence Muslim women as mentioned above, is not just in imparting knowledge but it's also in being a positive role model.

As well, teaching in Islamic weekend schools provides you with the opportunity to clarify the position of women in Islam, to clear it of the cultural baggage so many Muslim parents tend to pass down to their kids.

Teaching Urdu on the weekends is also a great way to pass on a part of our Pakistani heritage to the next generation. There are too few young Pak-Americans who know how to read and write Urdu, let alone speak it. Don't let one of Pakistan's official languages die out!

6. Promote and appreciate Pakistani women doing good work

How many of us spend time to appreciate the Pakistani women are doing for positive change in the country or in our local communities?

Whether it's a woman who has given an inspiring speech, written a useful article, established a fantastic program for women in Pakistan or locally at the mosque, a number of Pakistani women tend to beat each other down instead of trying to build each other up.

Promoting and appreciating women who are doing good work will not only serve as encouragement for them, it will also pinpoint acceptable role models for young Pak-American women.

7. Support Pak-American women in need or difficulty

Do you know a woman who takes care of her own kids, plus an ailing mother-in-law? Or someone who needs a night out with her husband after a frustrating week juggling work and home responsibilities? Give her a break. Offer to babysit for a night, or take her kids to the park so she can have some free time to herself. These small gestures give a big boost to sisterhood, not to mention support for a Pakistani family.

8. Teach Pak-American women how to deal with discrimination

How many women know how to respond effectively to discrimination and harassment? It seems that most will tend to ignore it. Others may respond with a rude remark of their own. But neither of these approaches is usually appropriate.

You can help here by developing an effective strategy in consultation with community leaders. Informing and enabling women on how to seek legal recourse if they so choose is another needed service.

9. Become journalists and media professionals

Do you think the ability to write well and communicate effectively has no effect on others?

You're wrong. A knowledgeable, Muslim Pakistani woman who can write and speak well is a powerful weapon in educating the Pak-American community about women's issues. She can also bring to the forefront women's issues in Pakistan and encourage others to help.

10. Use what you have

If you're already a working woman, how can you contribute without necessarily changing careers? Use your professional skills for the community.

If you can write well, establish a well-written, organized and attractive community newsletter. If you're in business, establish a community fundraising project a project helping women in Pakistan. Use what you've got. It'll take some thinking and planning, but you're almost bound to find a way you can contribute, if Allah wills.

SOURCE:www.yespakistan.com

WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS IN Pakistan



Pakistan is a federal republic with a population of approximately 168 million. The head of state is President Pervez Musharraf, who assumed power after overthrowing the civilian government in 1999 and was elected president in 2002. He affirmed his right to serve concurrently as chief of army staff in August 2002 through a series of controversial amendments to the 1973 constitution called the Legal Framework Order. In October an electoral college composed of the Senate, National Assembly, and the four provincial assemblies reelected Musharraf for a second five-year term. Domestic and international observers found the 2002 National Assembly elections deeply flawed. In October and December, former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif returned from exile and began campaigning for the January 2008 parliamentary elections. During a campaign rally on December 27, Bhutto was assassinated. In December Musharraf retired as chief of army staff and retook the presidential oath of office as a civilian. The head of government is Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammedmian Soomro, who replaced Shaukat Aziz after the government was dissolved in November after the completion of its five-year term. Under the law, when the parliament finishes its term, the president appoints a caretaker cabinet that governs through elections until a new government is formed.


The human rights situation worsened during the year, stemming primarily from President Musharraf's decision to impose a 42-day State of Emergency (SOE), suspend the constitution, and dismiss the Supreme and High Provincial Courts. During the year the judiciary sought to check executive power and reverse President Musharraf's March decision to suspend the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Civil society and the press widely supported the judiciary. The restored chief justice then began a series of legal interventions that received some public support but were considered excessive by the government. When he believed the Supreme Court was about to rule him ineligible for reelection as president, on November 3 Musharraf declared the SOE and suspended the constitution, which enabled him to replace the Supreme and High Court justices. Additionally, he demanded, as he had in 1999, that all judges, both replacements and sitting judges, swear an oath of loyalty to his new legal order, which they did in December. Under the SOE, Musharraf suspended basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech and assembly. In December Musharraf lifted the SOE and restored an amended constitution, which enhanced presidential powers. Regulatory restrictions continued on press activities and freedom of assembly.

During the 42 days of the SOE, the government imposed curbs on the media and arrested and/or detained over 6,000 lawyers, judges, political party workers/leaders, and civil society activists. By the end of the year, approximately one dozen activists, primarily lawyers and judges, remained under house arrest. The government restored public cable access to all but two channels of one private television station, but the government required the media to sign a code of conduct that discouraged criticism of the government and led to self-censorship. Other major human rights problems included restrictions on citizens' right to change their government, extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances. While the civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were instances when local police acted independently of government authority. Violence from a low-level secessionist movement in Balochistan continued. Lengthy trial delays and failures to discipline and prosecute those responsible for abuses consistently contributed to a culture of impunity. Poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest, and lengthy pretrial detention remained problems, as did a lack of judicial independence. Corruption was widespread within the government and police forces, and the government made few attempts to combat the problem. Rape, domestic violence, and abuse against women, such as honor crimes and discriminatory legislation that affected women and religious minorities, remained serious problems, although implementation of the 2006 Women's Protection Act improved conditions. Widespread trafficking in persons and exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor were ongoing problems. Discrimination against religious minorities continued. Child abuse, commercial sexual exploitation of children, discrimination against persons with disabilities, and worker rights remained concerns.

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces extrajudicially killed individuals associated with criminal and political groups in staged encounters and during abuse in custody. Through August the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners' Aid (SHARP) reported 23 encounter killings and 37 killings in police custody. Police stated that frequently these deaths occurred when suspects attempted to escape, resisted arrest, or committed suicide; however, human rights observers, family members, and the press reported that security forces staged many of the deaths.

The government frequently investigated and sometimes convicted police officials for extrajudicial killings. The police inspector general in Punjab stated that 1,254 police had been disciplined by August for a variety of crimes. However, lengthy trial delays and failures to discipline and prosecute those responsible for abuses consistently contributed to a culture of impunity.

On January 18, police arrested Ali Nawaaz and two of his friends in Karachi. Nawaaz died in custody on February 3. Although a doctor reportedly told Nawaaz's family that he had died of kidney failure, the family claimed they saw marks of torture on his body, including wounds on his head, neck, left kidney, legs, and back. Police initially refused to act on the matter, but after many locals protested and put pressure on the police to ask the father to lodge a case, he registered the case. By year's end no arrests had been made, but authorities transferred two accused officers to separate police departments.

On May 14, unidentified gunmen shot and killed Supreme Court Additional Registrar Syed Hammad Raza in his home. After an initial investigation, police said that the killing was in connection with a robbery; however, Raza's family and his colleagues in the legal community accused security agencies of the murder for Raza's alleged relationship with then-suspended chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhary. According to police, they arrested four suspects in June, and at year's end the trial was ongoing in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Rawalpindi.

On September 25, Malik Zaheer was found dead in Lahore after having been released on bail in May. Zaheer was on trial for the murder of Arif Bhinder, the Punjab assistant advocate general. Investigating officials told the media that Zaheer had been tortured before he died. Malik Zaheer's family alleged that Bhinder's family was responsible for orchestrating his death at the hands of the police and filed an application. According to the Global Foundation, the case of Arif Bhinder's death was ongoing at year's end in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Lahore, where it was last heard in November.

There were no developments in the January 2006 death in custody of Habibur Rehman in Chitral. Prior to his death, a doctor's report stated that Rehman was in shock and critical condition from being beaten. Rehman had been in police custody for alleged car theft.

Authorities charged police constable Mohammad Sarwar with the July 2006 shooting of Salman Ahmed, a 14-year-old boy, and the serious injury of the boy's 15-year-old friend, Muhammad Asghar Ali, in Lahore. Officer Malik Munir, who allegedly ordered the shooting, was placed on suspension and transferred. At year's end the case against Sarwar was pending, and according to SHARP, he was still employed as a constable but was under department investigation.

There were no developments in the 2005 death in custody case of Samiullah Kalhoro, the vice chairman of the Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz.

A district judge found Police Constable Mohammad Aslam and Assistant Sub Inspector Ghulam Shabbir Dasti guilty of torture and sentenced them to five years' imprisonment for the 2005 death in police custody of Abu Bakar Panwhar. Officer Mohammad Rafiq Siyal and Sub Inspector Khamiso Khan also were demoted and suspended for six months.

Continued clashes between security forces and militants, mostly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Islamabad, resulted in more than 1,350 deaths, including of civilians, militants, and security forces.

The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies reported that a total of 1,442 terrorist attacks left 3,448 persons dead and 5,353 injured in the FATA and throughout the country; this included 60 suicide attacks.

On July 3, an exchange of fire between police and militants inside Islamabad's Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) escalated to a military assault on the compound after heavily armed militants barricaded themselves inside the compound. The government claimed that there were 106 casualties: 73 militants, 10 security forces, one police officer, and several civilians. In August the Supreme Court ordered the Ministry of the Interior to explain the legality of the raid. By year's end the government had not responded.

On August 19, a helicopter gunship attack on suspected militant positions killed seven persons, including three women and two children, and injured eight others in three villages in Mirali, North Waziristan, according to local residents. A government spokesman countered that the attack killed 15 militants, most of whom were foreigners, and that two women who were killed were inside militant compounds.

In Balochistan, deaths from the ongoing insurgency decreased from the previous year; however, violence remained a problem throughout the province. According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media reports, at least 57 militants, 49 civilians, and 51 members of the security forces died as a result of the ongoing insurgency between the beginning of the year and late November. The government last released official figures in April 2006, recording the total number of deaths at 158.

On March 30, security forces reportedly attacked Langu and Sagari with helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. Four women and 12 children died during the operation, according to press reports.

On June 14, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a van in Quetta, killing seven soldiers, one police constable, and one passer-by. The gunmen also shot two policemen on a motorcycle. One later died, and the other was injured seriously. Police arrested three persons in September in connection with the killing, including two alleged members of the Balochistan Liberation Army.

In August 2006 Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Bugti, along with 35 accomplices and five military personnel, were killed following a suicide bombing. According to the media, Bugti and his followers were killed when the government air force bombed Bugti's hideout. The government stated the officers were trying to reach Bugti to speak to him when an unexplained explosion, perhaps perpetrated by Bugti himself in an effort to avoid detainment, caused the cave in which he was hiding to collapse. No police investigation was conducted into his death.

Mir Balach Marri, the son of another prominent Baloch leader, Nawab Khair Bux Marri, was killed in December; however, it was not known whether he was killed in the country or Afghanistan.

There were reports of politically motivated killings perpetrated by political factions.

On May 12, unidentified gunmen in Karachi shot and killed more than 40 political activists from multiple political parties during demonstrations planned to coincide with the arrival of the then-suspended chief justice of Pakistan. Many observers blamed the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party-–a member of the ruling coalition that controlled the Sindh provincial government-–for the violence, since there were multiple reports that the government had ordered police not to deploy to demonstration areas. MQM officials denied responsibility for the violence, claiming that 18 of the deaths were MQM members. Authorities later accused MQM of organizing demonstrations to disrupt the trial, which was ongoing at year's end.

In Karachi, MQM sources accused Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) activists of killing seven MQM active members during the year in ongoing violence between the two parties over political control of the province; JI accused MQM of killing five JI activists. Human rights observers reported that the total politically motivated death toll was 132 by year's end.

Taliban militants and their foreign supporters mounted suicide attacks and engaged in vigilantism, including murder, in the tribal areas as well as in settled districts of the NWFP, Balochistan, and Islamabad. During the year they killed security forces, government officials, tribal elders, religious leaders, and persons they accused as spies. They also bombed girls' schools, barber shops, hotels, and video shops.

On April 28, a suicide bomb attack at a political rally in Charsadda, NWFP, killed an estimated 28 persons and injured Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao and his son, NWFP Provincial Assembly member Iskander Sherpao. Authorities registered a case against the unknown assailants. By year's end no one had been arrested in connection with the attack.

On July 15, a suicide bomber entered a police recruitment and training center in Dera Ismail Khan and detonated a bomb, killing 28 persons including recruits and approximately 14 police officers. As many as 56 additional persons sustained injuries. Police in Dera Ismail Khan initially arrested 17 suspects, later releasing thirteen but holding four for observation. Authorities registered a case against the unknown assailants, but no one had been brought officially before a court by year's end.

On July 18, a suicide bomber killed 11 police officers and eight civilians and injured 50 at an Islamabad political rally. Police arrested three persons in September. The case was in process at the Anti-Terrorism Court at year's end.

On October 18, two suicide bombers killed 11 police officers and more than 130 civilians in Karachi during a procession to welcome former prime minister Benazir Bhutto's return. At year's end no one had been arrested.

On December 27, following an address at a campaign rally in Rawalpindi, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while riding in a vehicle leaving the rally. She died in a local hospital hours later. Authorities reported 30 other deaths, including those of policemen and party members.

Earlier on December 27, Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), held a rally in Karal Chowk where violence broke out in the crowd, resulting in the death of seven attendees. Unidentified assailants fled the scene, and no one was arrested; there were unconfirmed allegations of interparty violence.

Attacks on houses of worship, religious gatherings, and religious leaders linked to sectarian, religious extremist, and terrorist groups resulted in the deaths of at least 529 persons during the year. This included the deaths of approximately 300 persons killed in Sunni-Shi'a sectarian disputes in Parachinar.

On September 15, unknown gunmen in Peshawar shot and killed Maulana Hassan Jana, a prominent and well-respected Deobandi religious scholar who had declared suicide attacks "un-Islamic." Police arrested 13 suspects, but the case remained open at year's end.

Three members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned Sunni-Deobandi militant organization, were on trial at year's end for the February 2006 suicide bombing attack on a Shi'a congregation marking the Ashura festival in Hangu. The bombing killed 29 individuals and injured more than 50.

On July 4, Karachi police arrested another suspect in the April 2006 suicide bombing at a Sunni (Brelvi sect) birthday celebration in Karachi of the Prophet Mohammed. The bombing killed 59 persons and injured more than 100. The suspect, who reportedly confessed to his involvement in the crime, was a suspected member of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The case was ongoing at year's end.

Honor killings continued to be a problem, with women as the principal victims. During the year local human rights organizations reported between 1,200 and 1,500 cases. Most took place in Sindh and Punjab. Many more likely went unreported.

In September 2006 two assailants in the Muslim Bazaar of Sargodha in Punjab killed prominent Shi'a leader and former district president Syed Bashir Hussain Bukhtari of the outlawed Shi'a group, Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP). According to Taangh Wasaib Tanzeem, a Sargodha-based NGO, no one was arrested in connection with the death.

The government had not conducted investigations into sectarian violence reported in 2005, including the 2005 bombing that killed 40 and wounded more than 100 at the shrine of Pir Syed Rakheel Shah, the May suicide bombing that killed 20 and wounded more than 100 at the Bari Imam shrine, or the May suicide bombing that killed five and injured 30 at a Shi'a mosque in Karachi. No one was arrested for these actions.

b. Disappearance

Politically motivated disappearances occurred during the year. Police and security forces held prisoners incommunicado and refused to provide information on their whereabouts. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) estimated that approximately 1,600 persons were missing. Although some disappearances were associated with terrorism and national security cases, human rights organizations reported that many missing individuals were Sindhi and Baloch nationalists.

On April 4, Rafiq Khoso, a prominent activist and member of the Jamhoori Watan Party, and two student activists, Shabbir Jan Rind and Bashir Rind, allegedly were detained by security forces for their presumed involvement in the Balochistan Liberation Organization.

On June 7, security forces removed Waheed Kambarani and Sherdil Khan from a restaurant in Khuzdar, Balochistan. They appeared in a Khuzdar detention center in December. At year's end they remained incarcerated, and the details of the charges against them were unavailable.

During the year the Supreme Court ordered the government to release or regularize the detention status of prisoners held incommunicado by security agencies. Then-chief justice Chaudhry heard a petition filed earlier in the year by HRCP and 41 other petitions on behalf of 198 persons and in August ordered the government to find and release all the missing persons. In response, the Deputy Attorney General advised the Court in October that the government had located half of the 425 reportedly missing persons. They were picked up on suspicion of involvement in terrorism and released shortly thereafter. The rest were kept in different places in the country.

One of those located was Safdar Sarki, who appeared in court in October in southern Balochistan. At that time, he was able to meet with his sister and with his diplomatic representative. Sarki subsequently was moved to a prison in Zhob, a remote area of northern Balochistan. He complained of health problems related to his time in prison. According to Amnesty International, Sarki, a U.S. citizen with dual nationality and secretary general of the Jeay Sindh, a Sindhi nationalist political organization advocating for the rights of Sindhi citizens, had disappeared in February 2006 after he was seized by a group of 16 men, presumed to be plainclothes security officers.

On August 21, the Supreme Court ordered the release of Hafiz Abdul Basit and Aleem Naseer, ruling that the government had held the men too long without charge. After his release, Basit testified in court that he was malnourished and forcibly deprived of sleep. Naseer claimed that a government agent beat him with a hard rubber paddle to obtain his confession. Police had arrested Basit in 2004 on suspicion of his involvement in a 2003 assassination attempt against President Musharraf. Naseer was arrested on June 18 on suspicion of ties to al-Qa'ida.

On September 10, the Balochistan High Court ordered Muneer Mengal's release, saying that his detention was illegal. Police immediately rearrested him and charged him under the Maintenance of Public Order Act. Security forces detained Mengal, managing director of the first Baloch satellite television channel, in April 2006 for his efforts to publicize issues pertaining to inequities in Balochistan. By year's end Mengal had been moved to a Quetta district jail and produced before a court several times to discuss his case.

There was no update on the February 2006 disappearance of Abdul Rauf Sasoli or Saeed Brohi, members of the Baloch nationalist Jamhoori Watan Party; security forces reportedly had detained the two after their February 2006 arrest.

There was no update on the July 2006 disappearance of Bilal Bugti, the younger brother of Jamhoori Watan Party Secretary General Agha Shahid Bugti, or Murtaza Bugti, the son of Balochistan's first finance minister, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti.

Abid Raza Zaidi, who disappeared in October 2006 soon after he gave testimony about his illegal arrest, 110-day detention, and alleged abuse by army and police officers, was released in or around June.

There was no update on the December 2006 disappearance of Balochi political leader Ghulam Mohammed, who was arrested during a protest in Karachi following the death of Baloch leader Akbar Bugti during a military operation.

There were no developments in the 2005 disappearance of 18 members of the Pakistan Petroleum Workers' Union from Balochistan who had gone to Karachi for negotiations with their management, or the 2005 disappearance of Dr. Haneef Shareef, a writer, medical doctor, and member of the Balochistan Student Organization.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, there were persistent reports that security forces, including intelligence services, tortured and abused persons. Under provisions of the Anti-Terrorist Act, coerced confessions are admissible in Anti-Terrorism courts. Allegations that security personnel used abuse and torture of persons in custody throughout the country continued. Human rights organizations reported that methods included beating, burning with cigarettes, whipping soles of the feet, prolonged isolation, electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, and forced spreading of the legs with bar fetters. Security force personnel reportedly raped women during interrogations. The government rarely took action against those responsible.

On January 2, a group of approximately 15 men armed with small arms attacked and cut off the ears and nose of Multan-based Muhammad Iqbal and his brother Muhammad Yaseen after Iqbal married Shehnaz Bibi, a woman from the tribe of the attackers. Police arrested five suspects, and bail was refused for the suspects. The case was ongoing at year's end, and the suspects remained in prison.

On January 13, police in Khairpur, Sindh arrested Muhammad Ali for stealing a motorcycle. While he was in custody, police allegedly beat and tortured him for 10 days, damaging his leg muscles. He lost consciousness January 23, and police transferred him to a hospital. A police investigation found that Ali was not involved in the robbery, and police released him from custody January 31, according to the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). Ali's family withdrew the case against police officials. No action was reported against the staff of the police station.

On January 22, police in the Larkana district of Sindh arrested Hazoor Buksh Malik for not possessing a national identity card while he was in a market. The Station House Officer (SHO), Mohammad Tunio, allegedly tortured Malik by severing Malik's genitalia.

On February 20, five policemen stopped a vehicle at a checkpoint in Lahore and took one of the female occupants to a room near the post, allegedly to search her. All the officers raped the female while her family remained in the vehicle. The family pursued the case in the Lahore Police Administration. All five officers were found guilty and arrested under the Women's Protection Bill. At year's end the case was ongoing, and the officers were being held at the Kot Lakhpat Jail.

On July 1, police in Lahore arrested Mubarik Ali after he submitted a complaint about the behavior of a local police official. While he was in custody, police beat him with iron rods and clubs, causing loss of eyesight and the loss of his left leg. After the case garnered media attention, police investigated and suspended three police personnel. The accused police personnel disappeared in August, however, and the family alleged that police allowed the escape. By year's end the men had not been apprehended.

During the year the NGO Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid recorded 410 cases that they labeled torture in police custody through August. The AHRC reported approximately 1,100 cases of torture during the year. Alleged torture occasionally resulted in death or serious injury.

No charges had been brought against SHO Sadaat Ali for his alleged involvement in torturing Arif Ali and Irfan Ali in Multan in February 2006.

No action was taken against the police officers involved in the alleged beating and torture of Gul Waiz in Adiala Jail in July 2006 or the June 2006 sexual assault by police in Islamabad against Shahnaz Fatima and Javeria Alam.

By year's end a departmental inquiry found policeman Liaqat Ali guilty of rape, dismissed him from the service, and jailed him. Ali was arrested in July 2006 for allegedly raping a woman who went to a police check point in Islamabad to report being attacked.

Before the 2006 Women's Protection Bill, the Hudood Ordinances provided Koranic punishments for violations of Shari'a (Islamic law), including amputation and death by stoning. Authorities did not use such punishments.

Punishments for honor crimes included stripping women naked, mutilations, and rape.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions did not meet international standards and were extremely poor, except for those cells of wealthy or influential prisoners. Overcrowding was widespread. According to SHARP, there were 90,000 prisoners occupying 87 jails originally built to hold a maximum of 36,075 persons. The number increased from the previous year because of an increase in the number of political prisoners held under the Maintenance of Public Order Act after President Musharraf declared an SOE on November 3, according to SHARP. Under the SOE, approximately 6,000 individuals were arrested and held in temporary detention for a few hours to a few weeks.

Inadequate food in prisons led to chronic malnutrition for those unable to supplement their diet with help from family or friends. Access to medical care was a problem. Foreign prisoners often remained in prison long after their sentences were completed because there was no one to pay for deportation to their home countries.

Police reportedly tortured and mistreated those in custody and at times engaged in extrajudicial killings. Christian and Ahmadi communities claimed their members were more likely to be abused. Non-Muslim prisoners generally were accorded poorer facilities than Muslim inmates. They often suffered violence at the hands of fellow inmates.

On May 17, a man who was on trial for liquor possession died under mysterious circumstances in Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi. While jail officials claimed the man died of a heart attack, the man's family accused jail officials of torture. A district court ordered the man's body exhumed, and medical officials who examined the body found signs of torture. By year's end the accused jail officials and the family reportedly had settled the matter out of court.

On June 14, a political activist died of a heart attack while in police custody in Lahore. Police arrested the man in his home on June 6 in a wave of arrests before a political rally. According to media reports, his family told police he had a heart condition at the time of his arrest, and the man complained to police of chest pains. According to media reports, hospital officials stated that the man was dead on arrival when jail officials brought him to the hospital on June 14.

Child offenders generally were kept in the same prisons as adults, albeit in separate barracks. Police often did not segregate detainees from convicted criminals. Mentally ill prisoners usually lacked adequate care and were not segregated from the general prison population.

There were reports of prison riots, largely due to the poor living conditions inside prisons.

On September 29, prisoners at Mach prison near Quetta rioted during a search operation for illegal drugs. The inmates set fire to a prison building and took 24 prison wardens hostage, according to media reports. Prison officials said that the prison, which held 1,100 inmates, was built to hold 600 and that prisoners had complained of mistreatment.

In 2005 authorities established special women's police stations with all female staff in response to complaints of custodial abuse of women, including rape. The government's National Commission on the Status of Women claimed the stations did not function effectively, in large part due to a lack of resources. Court orders and regulations prohibit male police from interacting with female suspects, but male police often detained and interrogated women at regular stations. According to the International Human Rights Observer, a local NGO, there were 3,200 to 3,500 women in jails nationwide as of October.

Authorities subjected children in prison to the same harsh conditions, judicial delay, and mistreatment as the adult population. Local NGOs estimated that approximately 1,900 to 2,000 children were in prison at the end of the year. Child offenders could alternatively be sent to one of two residential reform schools in Karachi and Bahawalpur until they reached the age of 18. Abuse and torture reportedly also occurred at these facilities. Nutrition and education were inadequate. Family members were forced to pay bribes to visit children or bring them food.

The appeal against a December 2004 Lahore High Court ruling that struck down the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance remained pending. The ordinance was a separate procedural code for accused juveniles that provided numerous protections for juvenile offenders not found in the normal penal code. The ordinance remained poorly implemented; in September, however, a new Juvenile Justice Court became operational in Faisalabad.

Landlords in Sindh and Punjab, as well as tribes in rural areas, operated illegal private jails. On May 21, approximately 20 men, women, and children escaped a private jail run by Tahir Khan Khosa, a feudal landlord in rural Sindh. The escapees claimed that they had been in detention for the past three years after they were unable to repay debts to Khosa on time. Khosa denied the allegations, but the escapees appealed to Sindhi government authorities to investigate the case. By year's end the escapees reportedly accepted an out-of-court group settlement of approximately $1,650 (100,000 rupees) and forgiveness of their outstanding loans.

There were media reports that militant paramilitary groups also maintained private jails where detainees were physically and mentally tortured. In March after security forces clashed with militants in Kaloosha, South Waziristan, local tribesmen reportedly discovered a private jail that Uzbek militants used to hold and torture enemies.

Persons held for political offenses or on national security grounds were reported to be held in different conditions than the general prison population and often in separate facilities. The government permitted visits to prisoners and detainees by human rights monitors, family members, and lawyers, with some restrictions. Visits by local human rights monitors occurred during the year. Local NGOs, including Global Foundation, SHARP, and HRCP, frequently visited jails, subject to some restrictions. While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had access to jails, the government denied the ICRC access to alleged terrorist detainees.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the authorities did not always comply with the law.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

Police have primary internal security responsibilities for most areas of the country. Under the Police Order (Second Amendment) Ordinance promulgated in 2005, control of the police falls under elected local district chief executives known as nazims. Paramilitary forces such as the Rangers, the Frontier Constabulary, and the Islamabad Capital Territory Police fall under the Ministry of the Interior. Provincial governments control these forces when they assist in law and order operations. During some religious holidays, the government deployed the regular army in sensitive areas to help maintain public order.

Corruption within the police was rampant. Police charged fees to register genuine complaints and accepted money for registering false complaints. Bribes to avoid charges were commonplace. Individuals paid police to humiliate their opponents and avenge personal grievances. Corruption was most prominent among police SHOs, some of whom reportedly operated arrest-for-ransom operations and established unsanctioned stations to increase illicit revenue collection.

Police force effectiveness varied greatly by district, ranging from reasonably good to completely ineffective. Some members of the police force committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. Failure to punish abuses created a climate of impunity. Police and prison officials frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their families. The inspector general, district police officers, district nazims, provincial interior or chief ministers, the federal interior or prime minister, or the courts can order internal investigations into abuses and order administrative sanctions. Executive branch and police officials can recommend and the courts can order criminal prosecution, and these mechanisms were sometimes used.

The Punjab provincial government initiated regular training and retraining of police at all levels, both in technical skills and human rights. The Karachi city government reportedly gave the city's human rights officers facilities in which they could hold training. At least two NGOs, Sahil and SHARP, worked with police for the purpose of training. In 2005 President Musharraf reissued and amended the 2002 Police Order, which transfers oversight responsibility of police from provinces to districts and calls for the establishment of local oversight bodies. In the Punjab and NWFP, public safety commissions were established and functioned; however, according to SHARP and the Global Foundation, the commissions existed but operated under a vague mandate. During the year district public safety commissions in Punjab, Sindh, and a majority of districts in NWFP and Balochistan were established but their effectiveness was undermined because of inadequate staffing.

By August the government had converted 25 of Balochistan's 27 districts from "B areas" controlled by local levy forces who obeyed local tribal chiefs to "A areas" controlled by the police. Nearly 3,000 of the 3,560 levy forces in 2006 were converted to police, and nearly 1,500 local youth were inducted into the newly formed police force.

Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities‑‑particularly Christians, Ahmadis, and Shi'as‑‑from societal attacks.

Arrest and Detention

A First Information Report (FIR) is the legal basis for all arrests. Police may issue FIRs when complainants offer reasonable proof that a crime was committed. A FIR allows police to detain a named suspect for 24 hours, after which only a magistrate can order detention for an additional 14 days, if police show such detention is material to the investigation. In practice authorities did not fully observe these limits on detention. Authorities frequently issued FIRS without supporting evidence as harassment or intimidation, or they did not issue them when adequate evidence was provided unless the complainant could pay a bribe. Police routinely did not seek magistrate approval for investigative detention and often held detainees without charge until a court challenged them. Incommunicado detention occurred. When requested, magistrates usually approved investigative detention without reference to its necessity. In cases of insufficient evidence, police and magistrates colluded to continue detention beyond the 14 day period provided in the law through the issuance of new FIRs.

Police sometimes detained individuals arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort payment for their release. Some women continued to be detained arbitrarily and were sexually abused. Police also detained relatives of wanted criminals to compel suspects to surrender. Courts appointed attorneys for indigents only in capital cases. In some cases persons had to pay bribes to see a prisoner. Foreign diplomats could meet with prisoners when they appeared in court and could meet with citizens of their countries in prison visits, although not in all cases. Consular access was not always provided. Local human rights activists reported few restrictions to their access to prisons.

The district coordinating officer may order preventive detention for up to 90 days; however, human rights monitors reported instances in which prisoners were held in preventive detention for up to six months. Human rights organizations charged that a number of individuals alleged to be affiliated with terrorist organizations were held indefinitely in preventive detention. In corruption cases, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) may hold suspects indefinitely provided that judicial concurrence is granted every 15 days.

The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30 days of their arrest. Under both the Hudood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and nonbailable offenses. Bail pending trial is required for bailable offenses and permitted at a court's discretion for nonbailable offenses with sentences of less than 10 years. In practice judges denied bail at the request of police, the community, or on payment of bribes. In many cases trials did not start until six months after the filing of charges, and in some cases individuals remained in pretrial detention for periods longer than the maximum sentence for the crime for which they were charged. Human rights NGOs estimated that 50 to 52 percent of the prison population was awaiting trial.

As in previous years, the government used preventive detention, mass arrests, and excessive force to quell or prevent protests, political rallies, or civil unrest.

On June 15, Amnesty International expressed concern regarding a series of arbitrary arrests of opposition party workers and other political activists that had occurred over a two-week period. According to media reports, police arrested approximately 800 to 1,200 persons, primarily in Punjab, to prevent mass demonstrations protesting the suspension of the chief justice in March.

In early September police arrested hundreds of party workers from the PML–N in an effort to prevent welcome rallies for the return of exiled former prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

Following President Musharraf's declaration of an SOE on November 3, the government jailed or placed under house arrest approximately 6,000 lawyers, judges, political party activists, and civil society leaders. Most of those detained remained in prison for a few hours or up to a few days. At year's end 11 judges and three attorneys remained under house arrest. This included the former chief justice and those members of the Supreme and High Courts who refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Provisional Constitution Order, as well as attorneys Aitzaz Ahsan, president of the Pakistan Supreme Court Bar Association, Tariq Mehmood, and Ali Ahmed Khan. Authorities released attorney Munir Malik, former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association, from detention and provided him medical treatment for kidney failure following charges of mistreatment.

Following the imposition of the SOE, Aitzaz Ashan was detained under orders of violating the Maintenance of Public Order. At year's end Ashan remained under house arrest despite promises by government officials that he would be released by the end of the SOE on December 15. Ashan's wife was able to visit him, and he was allowed to submit his nomination papers for the election. He was released briefly for the three days of Eid al-Adha, and the caretaker human rights minister was looking into how he was rearrested following his Eid pardon. Munir Malik was arrested on November 3 after appearing on a talk show to discuss the political situation. Security forces held him in Adiala Jail, Rawalpindi, and moved him to Attock Jail, a remote facility in Punjab. According to human rights organizations, Malik reportedly fainted inside the jail after allegedly being severely beaten and began urinating traces of blood after being moved to a government hospital. He was prevented from seeing his family members. Others believed that Munir's health problems resulted from his chronic liver condition, which he had prior to his incarceration. Malik was charged with sedition but was released on November 24 with all charges dropped.

On November 3, Ali Ahmed Kurd, former vice president of the Pakistan Bar Council, was arrested and taken to Adiala Jail. On November 5, according to AHRC, he allegedly was removed by security forces but reportedly was kept in incommunicado detention and tortured.

On November 3, Asma Jahangir, a founding member of the HRCP and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion, was placed under arrest at her home in Lahore. Jahangir and 50 members of the HRCP were detained in what the government termed a "sub-jail." They were released on November 15.

Within hours of the president's November 3 suspension of the constitution and imposition of emergency, former chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry convened a seven-justice bench to issue an order against the action. Shortly after the order's announcement, the military entered the Supreme Court building and detained Chaudhry and the other justices. Although the SOE ended, the deposed Chaudhry and several other justices remained under house arrest at year's end. The government issued an eviction notice to Chaudhry to leave his government-owned home, and his children were not allowed to attend school.

According to human rights monitors, 80 percent of the female prison population was awaiting trial on adultery-related offenses under the Hudood Ordinances. However, with the enactment in December 2006 of the Women's Protection Bill, women are not supposed to be arrested under the Hudood Ordinance nor required to produce four witnesses to prove a charge of rape, as required under the zina laws (laws regarding extramarital sexual intercourse). Family members had previously used the Hudood Ordinances to control their children from making their own choices in marriage. Abusive husbands sometimes invoked the ordinances, or neighbors invoked the ordinances to settle personal scores. After the passage of the Women's Protection Bill, authorities released from prison approximately 300 to 500 women due to the less-harsh guidelines in the bill. In July the president promulgated the Law Reforms Ordinance, allowing women held under the Hudood Ordinance to be eligible for bail. According to the Progressive Women's Association, approximately 1,300 to 1,500 additional women were released upon the passage of the Law Reform Ordinance. This bail eligibility process, however, was stalled when the Supreme Court decided on a petition by a male prisoner who claimed gender discrimination because he was being held under similar charges and was not being granted bail eligibility because of his gender.

Special rules apply to cases brought by the NAB or before antiterrorist courts. Suspects in NAB cases may be detained for 15 days without charge (renewable with judicial concurrence) and, prior to being charged, were not allowed access to counsel. Despite government claims that NAB cases were pursued independently of an individual's political affiliation, opposition politicians were more likely to be prosecuted. The NAB prosecuted no serving members of the military or judiciary.

Accountability courts may not grant bail; the NAB chairman has sole power to decide if and when to release detainees. Antiterrorist courts do not grant bail if the court has reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty. Security forces may without reference to the courts restrict the activities of terrorist suspects, seize their assets, and detain them for up to one year without charges.

On October 5, the president promulgated a National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that provides a mechanism for amnesty for public office holders who were charged–-but not convicted–-for cases filed between 1986 and 1999 for political reasons. The ordinance was challenged in court, and by year's end no cases officially had been withdrawn, as the Supreme Court had not ruled on the NRO's legality.

There were no developments in the July 2006 arbitrary arrest of Naveed Ahmed, a local reporter for the Daily Koshish, a Sindhi language newspaper, while Ahmed was recovering from gunshot wounds in the hospital. According to the AHRC, Ahmed was implicated falsely in a kidnapping case. The AHRC claimed that Ahmed was a vocal and prominent journalist in the district who reported on police atrocities and on cases of financial corruption by local authorities. He was released in December.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary remained subject to executive branch influence at all levels. In nonpolitical cases, the high courts and Supreme Court generally were considered credible. However, the president's decision to use a Provisional Constitution Order to replace the Supreme and High Court benches called this credibility into question. Lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from prominent religious and political figures. The politicized nature of judicial promotions enhanced the government's control over the court system. Unfilled judgeships and inefficient court procedures resulted in severe backlogs at both trial and appellate levels. Ordinary cases take five to six years, while cases on appeal can take 20 to 25 years. In an April 15 speech, the then-chief justice stated that the backlog of cases pending before the Supreme Court had been reduced to 10,000, but a June statement from the AHRC estimated there were 20,000 pending cases.

There were several court systems with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions: criminal, civil and personal status, terrorism, commercial, family, military, and Shariat. The Federal Shariat Court, according to Article 203 of the Constitution, can be used to examine and decide whether any law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. Therefore, the passage of the Women's Protection Bill does not negate the possibility of Federal Shariat Court oversight in certain cases. Federal Shariat Court could be used for any issue that involves those parts of the Hudood Ordinance not moved to the secular law provisions, including gambling, liquor possession and drinking, and fornication in the false promise of marriage.

Feudal landlords in Sindh and Punjab and tribal leaders in Pashtun and Baloch areas continued to hold jirgas (local councils), at times in defiance of the established legal system. Such jirgas, particularly prevalent in rural areas, settled feuds and imposed on perceived wrongdoers tribal penalties that could include fines, imprisonment, or even the death penalty. In Pashtun areas, such jirgas were held under the outlines of the Pashtun Tribal Code. Under this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take revenge for wrongs real or perceived to redeem their honor. Frequently these disputes arose over women and land and often resulted in violence. In the tribal areas, the settling of many family feuds, particularly over murder cases, involved giving daughters of the accused in marriage to the bereaved.

Many tribal jirgas instituted harsh punishments such as the death penalty or watta-satta (exchange of brides between clans or tribes) marriages.

Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif established military courts in 1998 to dispense "quick justice." A 1999 Supreme Court decision invalidating military courts was not implemented. The human rights and legal community continued to press the Supreme Court to nullify military court decisions involving civilians, but this was difficult since the 1999 Provisional Constitutional Order forbids court review of actions taken by the chief executive (President Musharraf's title at the time) or his designees.

In November the president signed an ordinance amending the Army Act of 1952 so that it can be applied to civilians for certain crimes under the Explosive Substances Act, the Security of Pakistan Act, the Arms Ordinance Act, and the Anti-Terrorism Act. Human rights groups denounced the new amendment; the government claimed it was designed only to apply to terrorists. Many human rights organizations spoke out against the change, saying civilians would face unusually severe penalties for crimes ranging from libel to murder.

Trial Procedures

The civil, criminal, and family court systems provide for an open trial, the presumption of innocence, cross examination by an attorney, and appeal of sentences. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited number of judges, heavy backlog of cases, lengthy court procedures, and political pressure, cases routinely took years, and defendants had to make frequent court appearances. Cases start over when an attorney changes.

The Anti-Terrorist Act allows the government to use special streamlined courts to try violent crimes, terrorist activities, acts or speech designed to foment religious hatred, and crimes against the state. Cases brought before these courts are to be decided within seven working days, but judges are free to extend the period as required. All judges are appointed. Under normal procedures, the high court and the Supreme Court hear appeals from these courts. Human rights activists criticized this expedited parallel system, charging it was more vulnerable to political manipulation.

Special accountability courts try corruption cases brought by the NAB, including defaults on government loans by wealthy debtors. The NAB has not targeted genuine business failures or small defaulters. Accountability courts are expected to try cases within 30 days. In accountability cases, there is a presumption of guilt.

Despite government claims that NAB cases were pursued independently of an individual's political affiliation, opposition politicians were more likely to be prosecuted. The NAB prosecuted no serving members of the military or judiciary, which rely on courts martial and Supreme Judicial Council venues, respectively.

Courts routinely failed to protect the rights of religious minorities. Judges were pressured to take strong action against any perceived offense to Sunni orthodoxy. Discrimination cases dealing with religious minorities were rarely brought before the judiciary.

Laws prohibiting blasphemy continued to be used against Christians, Ahmadis, and members of other religious groups including Muslims. Lower courts often did not require adequate evidence in blasphemy cases, which led to some accused and convicted persons spending years in jail before higher courts eventually overturned their convictions or ordered them freed.

Bail in blasphemy cases usually was denied by original trial courts, arguing that since defendants faced the death penalty, they were likely to flee. Many defendants appealed the denial of bail, but bail was often not granted in advance of the trial. Lower courts frequently were intimidated, delayed decisions, and refused bail for fear of reprisal from extremist elements. The Federal Shariat Court is the court of first appeal in all Hudood cases that result in a sentence of more than two years. The Supreme Court, however, determined that in cases where a provincial high court decides to hear an appeal in a Hudood case, even in error, the Federal Shariat Court lacks authority to review the provincial high court's decision. The Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for Federal Shariat Court cases. A 2005 ruling allows the full Supreme Court to bypass the Shari'a bench and assume jurisdiction in such appellate cases in its own right. The Federal Shariat Court may overturn legislation that it judges to be inconsistent with Islamic tenets, but such cases are appealed to the Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court and ultimately may be heard by the full Supreme Court.

The law allows for the victim or the family to pardon criminal defendants in exchange for monetary restitution (diyat) or physical restitution (qisas). While diyat was invoked, particularly in NWFP and in honor cases in Sindh, qisas were not used.

There is a separate legal system in the FATA, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which recognizes the doctrine of collective responsibility.

Tribal leaders are responsible for justice in the FATA. They conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. The accused have no right to legal representation, bail, or appeal. The usual penalties consisted of fines. Federal civil servants assigned to tribal agencies oversee proceedings and may impose prison terms of up to 14 years.

Human rights NGOs expressed concern with the concept of collective responsibility, as authorities used it to detain members of fugitives' tribes, demolish their homes, confiscate or destroy their property, or lay siege to a fugitive's village pending his surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local tradition.

Reports of religious extremists and militants forming parallel administrations, including justice administrations, in FATA increased during the year. Public executions were the most visible manifestation of this trend.

On February 19, an Afghan national was beheaded publicly for his alleged spying for a foreign government near Miranshah in North Waziristan. The victim also had his hands and feet chopped off.

On March 14, a woman and two men from the Kukikhel tribe were publicly stoned to death by a tribal jirga in Bara on charges of adultery.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

Some political groups claimed their members were marked for arrest based on their political affiliation.

On August 5, PML-N leader Javed Hashmi was released on bail pending a Supreme Court review of his case. In 2004 Hashmi had been sentenced to 27 years on sedition charges after reading a letter in the cafeteria of the National Assembly critical of the military.

According to Baloch nationalist political leaders and human rights organizations, military intelligence and security forces had detained more than 500 Baloch nationalist political prisoners since the military operation began in the province in 2004. The exact number of prisoners was not available. The government denied imprisoning persons because of their political beliefs, but it was widely believed there were hundreds of Sindhi and Baloch nationalist leaders and activists imprisoned without formal charges.

In November 2006 police arrested Baloch nationalist leader Sardar Akhtar Mengal three days before he planned to lead a 500-mile march across Balochistan to protest the August 2006 killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by military forces. In December 2006 Mengal was charged in a Karachi Anti-Terror Court for an alleged April 2006 kidnapping of two military intelligence personnel. The HRCP complained that they were banned from attending Mengal's trial after they protested that he was confined behind iron bars in the courtroom and had been denied access to his family. On September 13, Mengal demanded an open public trial but by year's end, no decision was granted on his request.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Persons may petition high courts to seek redress for human rights violations, and courts often take such actions. Persons may seek redress in civil courts against government officials, including on grounds of denial of human rights in civil courts. However, observers reported that civil courts seldom or never issued official judgments in such cases and that most cases were settled outside of court. Although there were no official procedures for administrative redress, informal reparations were common.

f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law requires court-issued search warrants for property but not for persons. Police routinely ignored this requirement and at times stole items during searches. Police were seldom punished for illegal entry. In cases being pursued under the Anti-Terrorist Act, security forces were allowed to search and seize property related to the case without a warrant.

The government maintained several domestic intelligence services that monitored politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, the media, and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Despite a Supreme Court order, credible reports indicated that the authorities routinely used wiretaps and intercepted and opened mail without the requisite court approval. On July 2, the Supreme Court ordered the military Intelligence Bureau to remove all listening devices from the court and judges' homes. According to media reports, the order was given in response to a complaint by an attorney defending the suspended chief justice that the intelligence agencies were spying on judges, according to media reports.

In accordance with the Anti-Terrorist Act, the government banned the activities of and membership in several religious extremist and terrorist groups. However, some of the groups the government banned changed their names and remained active. Examples included Lashkar e Taiba (new name: Jamatud Dawa); Jaish e Muhammad (new name: Tehrikul Furqan & Al Rehmat Trust); Tehrik e Ja'afria Pakistan (new name: Tehrik e Islami Pakistan); and Sipah e Sihaba Pakistan (new name: Millat e Islamia Pakistan).

While the government generally did not interfere with the right to marry, local officials on occasion assisted influential families to prevent marriages the families opposed. The government also failed to prosecute vigorously cases in which families punished members (generally women) for marrying or seeking a divorce against the wishes of other family members. Upon conversion to Islam, women's marriages performed under the rites of their previous religion were considered dissolved, while the marriages of men who converted remained intact.

According to the Daily Mashriq, a government official in the northern district of Swat warned female teachers and students on September 25 to wear Islamic garb, citing threats from Taliban extremists active in the area.

In some cases authorities detained relatives to force a family member who was the subject of an arrest warrant into surrendering. NGOs alleged that intelligence personnel often harassed family members of Baloch nationalists.

SOURCE:www.state.gov

Sunday, January 3, 2010

Pakistan's rising toll of domestic violence


Aid workers in Pakistan have called for an urgent increase in the number of safe shelters available to the growing number of women who are victims of domestic violence.




Three times he told me he was divorcing me. Then he took a knife and cut off the end of my nose and all my hair.

Tehmima
Human rights workers says each year large numbers of women are beaten, tortured or burnt by their husbands or families, and they have few places to escape to.

Some have had their bones broken or their faces mutilated.

Seventeen-year-old Tehmina was married off to a businessman four times her age. She never considered leaving him despite the regular beatings.

But one day he went much further - when the whole family was out, he locked her in the bedroom. Tehmina says she was tied by her hands and feet to a bed while her husband announced three times he was divorcing her.

"Then he took a knife and cut off the end of my nose and all my hair."

Making choices

Tehmina is now at a shelter in Islamabad receiving medical treatment while her husband is in prison.



Horiffic injuries are sometimes inflicted


Aid workers say many women remain in violent relationships because they believe they must obey their husbands and that divorce is a disgrace.

A third of women in Pakistan are illiterate and have little concept about making their own choices.

Dr Noreen Khalid, programme officer for the shelter, says this imbalance can encourage abusive relationships.

"[The husband] sometimes becomes so powerful he becomes a sadist and he just forgets that his partner, his wife, is a human being," she says.

The shelter, which provides a safe haven for women and their children, is one of only two independently-run refuges which are open to all women.

The government-run shelters are only for those referred by the courts.

Legal help

But this is not only a place to hide and recuperate.



There needs to be special legislation on domestic violence [that] must mention that this is violence and a crime

Nahida Mahboob Elahi

It also offers the women the chance to talk about their problems, to restore their self-esteem, and even plan for the future.

The abused women often need practical support as well, such as legal advice to bring criminal cases.

But aid workers say the system is often stacked against the women.

The police often refuse to register cases unless there are obvious signs of injury and judges sometimes seem to sympathise with the husbands.

Nahida Mahboob Elahi, a human rights lawyer at the centre, wants new laws to be implemented.

"There needs to be special legislation on domestic violence and in that context they must mention that this is violence and a crime."

Lenient treatment

Zahida Perveen's husband accused her of being unfaithful and cut off her nose and ears and gouged out her eyes.



He is sitting quietly in jail, he is not feeling the same pain which I have felt, not going through the same misery I've gone through

Zahida Parveen

The centre helped her go abroad for treatment and to prosecute her husband, who is now serving a 14-year prison sentence.

Zahida, who is now blind, appreciated the support, but tells Nahida that she feels the sentence was far too lenient.

"He is sitting quietly in jail, he is not feeling the same pain which I have felt, not going through the same misery I've gone through, so this is not enough," she says.

The women are offered the chance to meet their husbands again to try to hammer out their problems. This sometimes leads to reconciliation.

Second chance

Humaira was constantly beaten by her husband and other members of his family before she finally ran away with their two children.

But she has recently met her husband again and after he apologised, she says she is prepared to give him a second chance.

The authorities in Pakistan appear to recognise the scale of domestic violence. But aid workers say not enough is being done.

They believe the victims need a proper network of support across the country - and that their attackers must not escape justice.

source:news.bbc.co.uk